Encrypted Note Apps Compared: Standard Notes, Joplin, Notesnook

What "End-to-End Encrypted" Actually Means Here

End-to-end encryption (E2EE) on a notes app means three things at once. The encryption key is generated on your device from your password, your note text is encrypted on your device before it is uploaded, and the server only ever stores the encrypted ciphertext. The Notesnook help docs put it plainly: "Everything you write is encrypted on your own device before it is sent anywhere." The Joplin help docs use the same idea from the other side: "no third party can decipher the data being communicated or stored." Obsidian's help page states that E2EE "means that the data is encrypted from the moment it leaves your device" and "can only be decrypted using your encryption key once it's back on one of your devices."

The corollary is what you give up. If the server only stores ciphertext, the server cannot reset your password and cannot recover your notes if you forget the password. Notesnook makes this explicit on the same help page: "this is also why we cannot reset your password or recover your notes for you." That tradeoff is the spine of every comparison that follows.

What is still visible to the server even with E2EE on

E2EE hides the contents of your notes. It does not hide everything. Obsidian's own Sync security page states that "Some metadata is not end-to-end encrypted: which device uploaded or deleted a file, when it was uploaded, and the mapping between encrypted file paths and encrypted content." Obsidian says the server reads that metadata "so it can route changes, determine the version history for a file, and keep devices in sync." The same caveat applies in some form to every encrypted notes service: the company has to know your account exists, when it logged in, and what to deliver to which device, and that minimum is hard to encrypt.

The Five Apps At a Glance

Standard Notes: XChaCha20-Poly1305 and Argon2

Standard Notes' help page states that "All your notes, tags, and other data generated using the Standard Notes applications are encrypted using XChaCha20-Poly1305, one of the strongest forms of encryption available." The page describes this algorithm as "recommended by leading technology companies like Cloudflare and Google as a replacement to AES-256."

For key derivation, Standard Notes says it uses "a password-stretching algorithm called Argon2 to strengthen your password and generate the necessary keys," and claims that "with a strong password, your encryption keys become impossible to guess, even with a network of supercomputers."

Encryption and decryption happen locally. Standard Notes' description: "completely offline and in your own private device. ... When you make a change to a note, the note is encrypted using your secret keys." The page also says data is automatically "signed," and that on decryption "this signature is validated to ensure that no one, including us, has tampered with your data."

Standard Notes points users to its open-source code on GitHub and to "several completed third-party security audits" as ways to verify those claims. The page does not enumerate the audit firms or dates, so the audits exist as a claim rather than a list; for a current audit history you would go to the Standard Notes GitHub repository and the company's own audit reports page.

The free tier gives you the encrypted notes experience on every platform the apps ship for. Paid tiers add features like longer revision history and additional editors; they do not change the encryption model.

What Standard Notes does not do

Standard Notes' model means if you lose your password, the company cannot recover your notes. This is shared with every other zero-knowledge service in this comparison. The recovery path is whatever recovery code or method Standard Notes generates at signup, and that path is the only one. The page is explicit that notes are "un-decipherable without your encryption key."

Joplin: XChaCha20+Poly1305 and Argon2id, but E2EE is opt-in

Joplin's E2EE is documented in two places: the user-facing help page and the technical specification in the project's repository. The user page describes what E2EE does and warns that you need to set a master password. The specification describes the cryptographic primitives.

The Joplin E2EE specification on GitHub lists the algorithm as XChaCha20+Poly1305 with a 256-bit key and a 192-bit nonce, with Argon2id as the key derivation function using 67,108,864 bytes of memory, 5 iterations, and parallelism 1. That is a recent, strong choice, not a decade-old cipher. The implementation is the same across web, desktop, and mobile because, as Notesnook puts it describing its own similar architecture: "Web, desktop and mobile use the same library for every cryptographic operation, so a note encrypted on one platform decrypts identically on the others." Joplin's cryptography also uses a single shared library (sjcl for the historical path and libsodium for the new 004 path).

The user-facing Joplin help page describes the flow: "This is the Master Key password which will be used to encrypt all your notes. Make sure you do not forget it since, for security reason, it cannot be recovered." The page is also clear on threat model: "only the owner of the data (i.e. notes, notebooks, tags or resources) can read it," with the goal that "no third party can decipher the data being communicated or stored."

Joplin's sync list is the broadest of any app in this comparison. The help page lists: Dropbox, OneDrive, Nextcloud, WebDAV, S3, and Joplin Cloud. You can point Joplin at your own Nextcloud or WebDAV server and skip Joplin Cloud entirely, which is the right choice if you do not want your encrypted ciphertext on infrastructure you do not control.

The opt-in problem

The Joplin help page makes E2EE opt-in, which trips a lot of new users. Joplin will happily sync your notes unencrypted to any target on that list until you turn on E2EE in Settings, and on top of that, E2EE only protects what Joplin syncs. The local SQLite database on your device is not encrypted by default. That is the single biggest gotcha in Joplin, and it is well known in the privacy community. Treat E2EE as required configuration rather than a default.

What Joplin does not do

If you lose your master password, Joplin cannot recover your notes. The Joplin help page is explicit on this: "it cannot be recovered." The encryption master key lives only in the devices that hold the password. There is no email reset and no support team that can decrypt your data.

Notesnook: Argon2id with explicit parameters

Notesnook's help page is the most technically specific of the four and is unusual because it names exact parameter values. The cipher is "XChaCha20-Poly1305-IETF," and the key derivation is "Argon2i" for the master key derivation with the note that "Web, desktop and mobile use the same library for every cryptographic operation."

The parameters are spelled out. The hash of your password for the server uses Argon2id, the data encryption key is generated with libsodium, and the encrypted payload carries a "192-bit nonce (`iv`)" and a "random `salt`." Notesnook's description of the encryption flow: "Everything you write is encrypted on your own device before it is sent anywhere. The Notesnook server stores ciphertext it cannot open."

Notesnook is also explicit about per-item encryption: "Each item in the database is encrypted separately using XChaCha20-Poly1305-IETF." That matters because it means a single compromised item does not leak a key that decrypts every other item in your account.

On account recovery, Notesnook's help page is the clearest in this comparison: "Your [account recovery key] is the only way back into your data. Without your password and without that key, your notes cannot be decrypted by anyone." The page also explains that "this is also why we cannot reset your password or recover your notes for you." Save the recovery key when Notesnook shows it to you at signup.

What Notesnook does not do

Same as the rest of the field: no password reset, no escrow. Notesnook does not promise a backup server can unlock your notes; it promises the server cannot, period. Treat the recovery key like a password manager master password.

Obsidian Sync: E2EE is opt-in, and the local vault is not encrypted

Obsidian is the odd one out, because the notes live on your device by default and Obsidian Sync is an optional paid add-on. Obsidian's privacy policy says "All data is saved locally on your device and is never sent to our servers" and "We do not collect any personal data" and "We do not collect any telemetry data." That is the local-only model. If you do not turn on Sync, your notes live in a Markdown folder on your disk and Obsidian never sees them.

Once you turn on Sync, the model changes. The Obsidian Sync security help page lists the encryption as "AES-256 using Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)" with key derivation "scrypt with salt."

There are two encryption modes for Sync. The Obsidian help page describes them: "End-to-end encryption (default) offers the strongest security but requires you to safely store your encryption password." The standard mode, by contrast, says "Your encryption key is generated by the app and used to protect your data in transit and on the server. Because the encryption key is stored on company servers, it can be used to decrypt your data." That second mode is encryption in transit and at rest, not end-to-end. The default for new vaults is E2EE, but the page treats the older key-on-server mode as an option that still exists.

The local-vault problem

The same help page is blunt: "Obsidian doesn't encrypt your local vault." Your notes are plain Markdown files on your disk. If someone gets access to the device or pulls the disk image, they get the notes. Sync's encryption only protects what crosses the wire and sits on Obsidian's servers. Local-device encryption is a separate problem, and Obsidian's answer is that local-device encryption is the operating system's job (FileVault on macOS, BitLocker on Windows, full-disk encryption on Linux).

What the Sync server still sees

Even with E2EE, the Obsidian help page lists the metadata that the server reads: "which device uploaded or deleted a file, when it was uploaded, and the mapping between encrypted file paths and encrypted content." That is the cost of routing changes and keeping devices in sync, and Obsidian states it plainly.

Obsidian Sync runs on DigitalOcean. The Sync security help page lists the regions as Singapore (Asia), Frankfurt, Germany (Europe), San Francisco, USA (North America), and Sydney, Australia (Oceania). The data center is chosen "based on your IP location, at the time when you first set it up." Once set, you have to migrate manually if you want to move.

Pricing, briefly

Obsidian's Sync page lists Sync Standard at $4 per month on an annual plan or $5 per month monthly, with 1 GB of storage and a 5 MB maximum file size. Sync Plus is $8 per month on annual or $10 per month monthly, with 10 GB of storage, 200 MB maximum file size, and 12 months of version history. Sync Plus is also "Upgradable to 100 GB storage."

What Obsidian does not do

Obsidian cannot recover an E2EE vault if you lose your encryption password. The help page says as much when it warns that E2EE "requires you to safely store your encryption password." With standard (non-E2EE) encryption, Obsidian holds the key and can in principle recover your data; with E2EE, the company is in the same position as Standard Notes, Notesnook, and Joplin, which is that you are the only party who can unlock your notes.

Apple Notes: E2EE only with Advanced Data Protection turned on

Apple Notes is the default for anyone in the Apple ecosystem, so it deserves a careful read rather than a dismissal. The encryption posture depends entirely on whether you have turned on Advanced Data Protection for iCloud.

Apple's Advanced Data Protection support page states: "Advanced Data Protection for iCloud offers our highest level of cloud data security and protects the majority of your iCloud data using end-to-end encryption." That page lists Notes among the iCloud data categories covered by end-to-end encryption when ADP is on. Apple's framing: "No one else can access your end-to-end encrypted data, not even Apple, and this data remains secure even in the case of a data breach in the cloud."

Without Advanced Data Protection turned on, Apple's standard iCloud data protection applies, which means Apple holds the encryption keys for your iCloud data and can decrypt it in response to a valid court order. Advanced Data Protection is an opt-in, account-wide setting; you do not turn it on per note.

Apple's ADP page also describes the sharing boundary: "Advanced Data Protection is designed to maintain end-to-end encryption for shared content as long as all participants have Advanced Data Protection enabled. This level of protection is supported in most iCloud sharing features, including iCloud Shared Photo Library, iCloud Drive shared folders, and shared Notes." The exception list is short: "iWork collaboration, the Shared Albums feature in Photos, and sharing content with 'anyone with the link,' don't support Advanced Data Protection." Shared notes do keep E2EE only when every collaborator has ADP on.

The locked-notes password

Apple Notes also has a "locked note" feature that asks for a separate password or uses your device passcode. Locked notes are encrypted independently of iCloud's broader encryption posture. The combination most privacy-conscious readers end up with is: iCloud with Advanced Data Protection on, plus locked notes turned on for the most sensitive entries, plus a strong Apple ID password with a hardware security key as the second factor. None of those choices are free, but they are also all standard Apple features.

The Hard Tradeoff: Password Recovery

Every zero-knowledge app in this comparison ends at the same wall. Notesnook's help page states it most cleanly: "this is also why we cannot reset your password or recover your notes for you." Standard Notes, Joplin, and Obsidian Sync with E2EE say the same thing in their own words. The server cannot read your notes, which means the server cannot help you read them either.

The practical answer is a password manager. If you do not already use one, this comparison is a poor moment to choose a notes app without one. A Bitwarden, KeePass, or 1Password vault is what holds the master password, the Notesnook recovery key, and the Obsidian Sync encryption password for you. Storing a master password on a sticky note is fine as a backup, but only as a backup.

Which App Should You Actually Use

If you want the strongest possible zero-knowledge model and you do not need Markdown, Notesnook is the cleanest pick. The help page spells out the cipher and parameters, the architecture is zero-knowledge, and the recovery key model is honest about what it can and cannot do.

If you want Markdown, local-first storage, and the ability to point at your own sync backend, Joplin is the strongest choice. Turn on E2EE in Settings before you start syncing, and treat the master password like the key to a safe.

If you want Markdown, local-first storage, and an ecosystem of community plugins, Obsidian with Sync is a strong choice, especially if you are already paying for Obsidian's other paid features. The catch is local-device encryption, which Obsidian punts to the operating system.

If you want a clean, open-source, multi-platform experience with a long track record, Standard Notes is the safest default. The XChaCha20-Poly1305 plus Argon2 combination is current, the code is open source, and the threat model is documented.

If you are already inside the Apple ecosystem, Apple Notes with Advanced Data Protection for iCloud turned on is reasonable, and you can add the locked-notes password for the most sensitive entries. The tradeoff is lock-in: your notes live inside Apple's apps, sync, and account.

What Each App Can and Cannot See

The Bottom Line

References

1. Standard Notes: How does Standard Notes secure my notes?
2. Joplin: End-To-End Encryption (E2EE)
3. Joplin project repository: E2EE technical specification
4. Notesnook: How is my data encrypted?
5. Obsidian Help: Obsidian Sync Security and Privacy
6. Obsidian: Sync product page
7. Apple Support: About Advanced Data Protection for iCloud