Nine Justices Will Decide If Your Phone Makes You a Suspect

The United States Supreme Court building with its white marble columns and steps under a clear sky — Photo via Unsplash

TL;DR: Today, April 27, 2026, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Chatrie v. United States, the case that will decide whether police can force Google to search its entire location database and identify every phone near a crime scene. The government says you gave up your privacy by enabling location history. Chatrie's lawyers say this is a digital general warrant: the exact thing the Fourth Amendment was written to prevent. Two federal circuits disagree. Fifteen judges on the Fourth Circuit wrote nine separate opinions and still couldn't settle it. Now nine justices will. A ruling is expected by late June. It will shape surveillance law for a generation.

What Happens Today

At 10 a.m. ET, the justices will hear roughly an hour of oral arguments in Chatrie v. United States (No. 25-112). The attorneys on each side get 30 minutes to make their case and answer whatever the justices throw at them ^[1].

On one side: Michael Price, arguing for Okello Chatrie, who was convicted of a 2019 bank robbery after a geofence warrant pulled his phone's location data from Google, along with data from 18 other phones belonging to people who had nothing to do with the crime ^[2].

On the other: the U.S. government, arguing that Chatrie forfeited his privacy when he turned on Google Location History and that the warrant was reasonable.

The question before the Court, stripped to its bones: "Whether the execution of [a] geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment" ^[3].

Simple question. The answer will reshape how 330 million Americans interact with their phones.

The Two Arguments in 60 Seconds

Chatrie's side: A geofence warrant is a general warrant. Police don't have a suspect. They don't have probable cause for any specific person. They draw a circle on a map and tell Google: search all 592 million accounts and tell us who was there. The Fourth Amendment was written specifically to ban this. These warrants are the digital version of British soldiers kicking in every door on a street looking for one thief ^[4].

Google's location data is also far more precise than the cell-site records the Court protected in Carpenter v. United States (2018). Google logs your position every two minutes using GPS, Wi-Fi, cell towers, and Bluetooth. The government says you "opted in." But Google's permission screens never told users their data would be searched by police without probable cause ^[5].

Government's side: This isn't Carpenter. Cell-site data is collected automatically whether you want it or not. Google Location History is opt-in. You chose to share it. Under the third-party doctrine, information voluntarily given to a company gets less Fourth Amendment protection. And the data shows only short-term, publicly observable movements (where Chatrie was for one hour on one day) not the exhaustive seven-day tracking record at issue in Carpenter ^[6].

The government also argues the three-step process (anonymize, narrow, unmask) is a reasonable search, not a general one, because police refine the results before anyone gets identified.

Why the Fifth Circuit Called Them General Warrants

This isn't a close call in every courtroom. The Fifth Circuit (covering Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi) already ruled geofence warrants are categorically unconstitutional. In United States v. Smith (2024), the court wrote that they are "the modern equivalent of the reviled 'general warrants' of the colonial era" ^[7].

The logic is straightforward: at Step 1, before any "narrowing" happens, Google has to search every single account in its database. All 592 million of them. For every person's location at a given time. The court said that alone constitutes an unreasonable search, no matter what filtering happens afterward.

You can't un-search someone's data. Once Google runs the query, the government has already looked.

The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, produced a 126-page collection of nine separate opinions from 15 judges who couldn't form a majority on why the conviction should stand. Some said geofence warrants aren't searches. Some said they are but fall under the good-faith exception. One judge, the lone dissent, said the evidence should have been suppressed entirely ^[8].

That level of judicial confusion is exactly why the Supreme Court took the case.

11,000 Warrants a Year, One in Four

Google received 11,554 geofence requests in 2020 alone. By that point, geofence warrants made up 25% of all law enforcement data requests to Google, one in every four requests ^[9].

Usage surged 1,500% between 2017 and 2018. Google stopped publishing granular numbers after 2021 ^[9].

The collateral damage has been documented. Jorge Molina spent six days in an Arizona jail after a geofence warrant flagged his phone near a murder scene. He'd loaned his phone to his mother's ex-boyfriend, who turned out to be the killer. A Florida man was investigated for burglary because he rode his bicycle past a broken-into house ^[10].

In the Chatrie case itself, 18 of 19 phones caught in the dragnet belonged to bystanders. A 95% innocent-person rate. On a single warrant.

Who Filed Briefs

The pile of amicus briefs tells its own story. The ACLU, EFF, EPIC, NACDL, and NYU's Tech, Law & Policy Clinic all filed in support of Chatrie ^[3]. So did X Corp. (formerly Twitter), arguing all searches of private property require warrants based on individualized probable cause.

EPIC told the Court that geofence searches "need a warrant with particularized probable cause," meaning police should have to show reason to believe a specific person's data will provide evidence, not just that a crime happened somewhere near a lot of phones ^[11].

On the government's side: the Department of Justice and a coalition of state attorneys general who argue the tool is essential for solving crimes where there are no leads.

The National Association of Counties filed a brief too, concerned about the impact on local law enforcement's ability to solve violent crime ^[12].

Google Changed Its Policy. That Doesn't Fix This.

In December 2023, Google announced it would move Location History storage to users' devices, encrypted so Google can't read it. The change rolled out through 2024 ^[13].

If it works as advertised, Google can't comply with geofence warrants anymore. The data isn't centralized.

But this doesn't matter for the case. Chatrie's data was collected in 2019. And Google's policy change doesn't bind anyone. The EFF called these commitments "pinkie promises": no independent audit, no legal obligation to maintain them ^[13].

More important: Google isn't the only company that tracks your location. Wireless carriers, fitness apps, car manufacturers, ad-tech companies, and smart-home devices all collect granular location data. If the Supreme Court says geofence warrants are constitutional, every one of those companies becomes a target for the same kind of dragnet request.

Google was just the first company with the infrastructure to process them at scale. It won't be the last.

What to Watch For in the Ruling

The decision won't land today. Expect it by late June or early July, when the Court wraps its current term. But the oral arguments will signal where the justices are leaning. Here's what matters:

Does the third-party doctrine hold? The government's entire argument rests on the idea that you gave up your privacy by using Google. If a majority of justices push back on that, like they did in Carpenter, the government loses its foundation.

How do they frame Step 1? Chatrie's best argument is that the initial database search is the unconstitutional act. If the justices accept that searching 592 million accounts is itself a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, geofence warrants are finished.

Do they ask about other companies? If the justices probe whether a ruling would extend to carriers, fitness trackers, and car manufacturers, they're thinking about consequences. That could push them toward a narrower ruling.

Does the good-faith exception dominate? Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits found the evidence admissible under good faith, even while disagreeing on constitutionality. If the justices focus heavily on this exception, they might dodge the constitutional question entirely. That would be the worst outcome for privacy: no clear rule, but police keep using the tool.

What You Can Do Right Now

Disable Google Location History

Android: Settings → Location → Location Services → Google Location History → Turn off. iPhone: Go to your Google Account → Data & Privacy → Location History → Turn off. Then delete existing data.

Audit Every App's Location Access

Your weather app, social media, and shopping apps probably have location access. Set them to "While Using" or "Never." Geofence warrants work because companies have your data. Give them less.

Follow the Case

Track Chatrie v. United States (No. 25-112) at SCOTUSblog. Oral argument transcripts are usually released same day. The audio posts to the Court's website on Fridays.

Tell Your Members of Congress

Win or lose in court, Congress can pass legislation restricting geofence warrants. The Geofence and Reverse Keyword Warrant Act has been introduced before. If this issue matters to you, find your representative and tell them.

References

Published: April 27, 2026